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This article reinvigorates the separation of balance rationale in the U.S. employment law con-
text, specifically addressing the Conflicting Foreign Laws Defense. Congress has explicitly amended
certain U.S. employment laws to extend extraterritorially. It also included the Conflicting Foreign
Laws Defense in the statutes. The hotly debated interpretations of foreign "law" in the Defense
exhibit how courts have blurred the situations under which Congress intended an employer's actions
to qualify for the Defense.
To clarify how courts should interpret the Defense, this article criticizes Mahoney v. RFE/RL-
the controversial case on the Defense-using the rationale behind Morrison v. National Australia
Bank Ltd., expressio unius est exclusio alterius, and the purpose behind U.S. employment laws to
encourage a narrow reading offoreign "law."
Introduction
In this increasingly global economy, the number of U.S. employees who work abroad
(expatriates) is steadily increasing.' A highly controversial issue is the extent to which
these U.S. employees who work abroad for U.S. employers are still protected by U.S.
employment laws. Congress has expressly provided that three U.S. employment laws-
the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA),2 the Age Discrimination in Employment Act
* Associate at Winstead PC; J.D. 2012, SMU Dedman School of Law; B.A. 2009, The University of
Texas at Austin. I thank my parents, sisters, Chad Li, and friends for their love and support. Special thanks
go to Professor Anthony J. Colangelo and his Fall 2011 Extraterritorial Jurisdiction class for helpful
comments and feedback.
1. The term "expatriate" generally "refers to people [who] do not plan to reside in their new country
permanently and normally retain their citizenship for practical purposes." See, e.g., Expatriates: An Overview
of the Expatriate Market, JusT LANDED, http://www.justlanded.com/english/Common/Footer/Expatriates
(last visited Jan. 4, 2013). "Expatriate" derives from the Latin term "expatriare," which means "to leave one's
own country." Id.
2. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(c)(1) (2006).
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(ADEA),3 and Tide VI4-extend extraterritorially. By contrast, Congress has identified
when U.S. employment laws do not have extraterritorial application.5
This background suggests that the extraterritorial application of U.S. employment laws
is clear and well established. But the analysis is not so simple. Employers may raise the
Conflicting Foreign Laws Defense (the Defense), which allows a U.S. employer that is
located abroad to act contrary to U.S. law if compliance with U.S. law would cause the
employer to violate the foreign state's "law."6 The three statutes mentioned above each
have the Defense written in as a provision, and each reads:
It shall not be unlawful for an employer, employment agency, or labor organization
(1) to take any action otherwise prohibited... where such practices involve an em-
ployee in a workplace in a foreign country, and compliance [with U.S. employment
laws] would cause such employer, or a corporation controlled by such employer, to
violate the laws of the country in which such workplace is located. 7
This is where the law is murkier.8 Table 1 exhibits an example of the current state of
the law for the Conflicting Foreign Laws Defense.
3. 29 U.S.C. § 623(f)(1) (2006).
4. Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Tide Vfl), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-l(b) (2006).
5. See Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. § 213(o (2006).
6. See, e.g., id. § 623(0(1).
7. See id. (emphasis added) To measure whether a U.S. employer "controls" the corporation, Congress set
forth four factors: "(A) interrelation of operations, (B) common management, (C) centralized control of labor
relations, and (D) common ownership or financial control, of the employer and the corporation." See id.
§ 623(h)(3). For this article's purposes, "employer" will refer to both the U.S. employer that operates abroad
and the corporation that is controlled by a U.S. employer.
8. See Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), Policy Guidance: Analysis of Sec. 4(0(1)
"Foreign Laws" Defense of the Age Discrimination of Employment Act of 1967, EEOC Notice No. N-
915.046 (1989), reprinted in EEOC Compliance Manual, 1989 CCH EEOCCM 1 6524 (No. N-915.046,
1989), available at 2009 WL 3608228 [hereinafter EEOC Policy Guidance]; see also Sandra Miller, Note, Re-
Examining the Role of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission Regarding Title VI's Foreign Laws Defense,
31 GEO. WASH. J. INT'L L. & ECON. 439, 439 (1998) ("Unfortunately ... the law is often ambiguous and no
definitive answers guiding employers exist.").
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basis of age in the discriminate against because of their age. practices." the "law" (read to
workplace. 12  an employee on the include "policies or
basis of age in the practices") and the
workplace, but some ADEA.
"policies or practices"




or she turns 65.
Proposal: Proposal:
Not unless Congress No, because currently
indicates that "law" there is in fact no
includes "policies or true conflict between
practices." the ADEA and
foreign law.




an employee on the
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4 Same as Row 2. Also agrees that the Same as Row 2. No. No.
employer cannot
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basis of age in the
workplace.
This article focuses on Situation 2 of Table 1, which is where the law is currently the
most contentious. Congress has not specified what constitutes foreign "law" beyond the
word "law.' 13 The leading case on the Conflicting Foreign Laws Defense is Mahoney v.
RFE/RL in the D.C. Circuit.14
This article's main objective is to show that although courts have wrestled with the term
foreign "law" in the Conflicting Foreign Laws Defense, Congress, not the courts, should
decide what constitutes foreign "law." It adds to the discussion by using several canons of
9. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-l(b) (2006).
10. See Kern v. Dynalectron Corp., 577 F. Supp. 1196, 1203 (N.D. Tex. 1983); see also infra Part I(C).
11. Note that in Kern, the employers chose to use the bona fide occupational qualification exception, but it
serves as a good "true conflict" example for the Conflicting Foreign Laws Defense because the U.S. law and
Saudi law directly conflicted. See Kern, 577 F. Supp. at 1199, 1203.
12. 29 U.S.C. § 623(a) (2006).
13. See, e.g., id. § 623(0(1).
14. See generally Mahoney v. RFE/RL, Inc., 47 F.3d 447 (D.C. Cir. 1995), rev'g, 818 F. Supp. I (D.D.C.
1992), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 866 (1995).
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statutory construction to indicate that courts should not presume Congress intended an
employer's actions to qualify for the Defense unless Congress "affirmative [ly]" indicated
that intent.15 Courts should not be in the business of amending statutes. Congress speak-
ing with one voice, rather than the courts speaking with several voices, will provide more
predictability and uniformity. The highlight of this article is that courts should narrowly
interpret foreign "law" to only include "law," because Congress has been clear in its defi-
nition-"law" means law. The only way Congress could be clearer than "law" meaning
"law" would be to include the phrase "law and only law," which is redundant. 16 Scholars
and federal agencies have expressed that the Defense is unclear, and some have suggested
various interpretations of, or amendments to, the Defense. 17 To be clear from the outset,
because Congress has already indicated its intent, Congress does not need to amend the
statutes if it intended "law" to only include law. Thus, this article will not propose varia-
tions to the statute, nor does it recommend that Congress amend the statutes.
Part I will provide an overview of U.S. employment laws and the relevant case law that
led to Congress amending the ADEA, Title VII, and the ADA to apply extraterritorially.
Part I will focus on the Maboney district and appellate courts' opinions. Specifically, Part
1I will compare the district court's narrow interpretation of foreign "law" with the D.C.
Circuit's broad interpretation. Part Il, the heart of this Article, will analyze the Conflict-
ing Foreign Laws Defense in light of Morrison v. NationalAustralia Bank Ltd. and ordinary
canons of statutory construction. This analysis will lead to Part IV, which recommends
that because Congress has not "affirmative[ly]" indicated otherwise, courts should defer to
Congress and narrowly interpret foreign "law."' 8
I. Background of U.S. Employment Laws's Extraterritorial Application
This section sets forth the circumstances under which Congress explicitly amended
three U.S. employment laws-the ADA, ADEA, and Title VI-to apply extraterritori-
ally. The amendments were mainly congressional reaction to unfavorable case law
results. 19
15. See Morrison v. Nat'l Ausd. Bank Ltd., 130 S. Ct. 2869, 2877 (2010).
16. Telephone Interview with Anthony J. Colangelo, Assoc. Professor of Law, SMU Dedman School of
Law (Oct. 31, 2011).
17. See, e.g., EEOC, Enforcement Guidance on Application of Title VII and the Americans with Disabili-
des Act to Conduct Overseas and to Foreign Employers Discriminating in the United States, EEOC Notice
915.002 (1993), reprinted in EEOC COMPLIANCE MANUAL, 1993 CCH EEOCCM 1 2169 (No. 915.002,
1993), available at 2009 WL 3607916 [hereinafter EEOC Enforcement Guidance]; EEOC Policy Guidance,
supra note 8, at C(2); Miller, supra note 8, at 446-47; Meredith P. Cook, Note, The Extraterritorial Application
of Title VII: Does the Foreign Compulsion Defense Work?, 20 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT'L L. REv. 133, 163 (1996);
Wm. Scott Smith, Comment, Extraterritorial Application of Title VII and the Americans with Disabilities Act:
Have Statute, Will Travel, 36 S. TEx. L. REv. 191, 196-97 (1995); James D. Phipps, Comment, Kiss of Death:
Application of Title VI's Prohibition Against Religious Discrimination in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, 1994 BYU L.
REv. 399, 424-26 (1994).
18. Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2877.
19. See infra Part I(A)-(B).
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A. AGE DISCRIMINATION IN EMPLOYMENT ACT (ADEA)
The ADEA protects employees from age discrimination in the workplace. 20 In 1983,
the Third Circuit decided in Cleaty v. U.S. Lines, Inc. that the ADEA did not apply extra-
territorially.2 1 The Cleary district court reasoned that "[tihe legislative history of the
ADEA and its amendments [are] silent on whether the Act applies extraterritori-
ally... [t]herefore, [the] court must assume that Congress intended to retain the territo-
rial restriction." 22 Congress was concerned that "an opportunity existed for domestic
employers with operations in the United States and in a foreign country to circumvent the
ADEA through the transfer of older employees to an overseas operation where mandatory
retirement could be enforced with impunity."23 Thus, in reaction to Cleary, Congress
amended the ADEA in 1984 to "insure that the citizens of the United States who are
employed in a foreign workplace by U.S. corporations or their subsidiaries enjoy the pro-
tections of the [ADEA]."24 The amendment included defining "employee" to encompass
"any individual who is a citizen of the United States employed by an employer in a foreign
country."2 5 The amendment also included the Conflicting Foreign Laws Defense to limit
when employers could be liable under the ADEA.26
B. TITLE VII AND THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITY ACT (ADA)
Congress enacted Title VII to prevent discrimination in the workplace "on the basis of
race, color, sex, religion, or national origin. ' 27 Originally, Title VII did not include lan-
guage that indicated extraterritorial application. 28 Then in 1991, the Supreme Court reaf-
firmed that Title VII did not apply extraterritorially in EEOC v. Arabian American Oil Co.
(ARAMCO).29 The EEOC argued that because Congress included the terms "employer"
and "commerce," Title VII applied to U.S. employers that employed U.S. employees
abroad. 30 The Court disagreed and applied the presumption against extraterritoriality.31
Specifically, the Court reasoned, "legislation of Congress, unless a contrary intent ap-
pears, is meant to apply only within the territorial jurisdiction of the United States."32
The Court's holding effectively limited Tide VII's scope to employers within the United
States. 33 Notably, the Court recognized that Congress is the branch of government with
the power to extend the law extraterritorially and that the Court should aim to "[avoid]
20. 29 U.S.C. § 623(a) (2006).
21. Cleary v. U.S. Lines, Inc., 555 F. Supp. 1251, 1263 (D.NJ. 1983), aif'd, 728 F.2d 607 (3d Cit. 1984).
22. Id. at 1259 n.3, 1259.
23. EEOC Policy Guidance, supra note 8, at B.
24. S. REP. No. 98-467, at 27 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2974, 3000.
25. 29 U.S.C. § 630(0 (2006); Older Americans Act Amendments of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-459, § 802(a),
98 Star. 1767, 1792 (1984).
26. See 29 U.S.C. § 623(0(1).
27. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a).
28. See Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, § 702 (1964).
29. See EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244, 249 (1991).
30. Id. at 248-49.
31. See id. at 249.
32. Id. at 248 (quoting Foley Bros. v. Filardo, 336 U.S. 281, 285 (1949)).
33. See id. at 259.
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potential international discord."34 Later in the same year ARAMCO was decided, Con-
gress accepted the Court's invitation and amended Title VII to apply extraterritorially.
35
Congress enacted the ADA to prohibit discrimination in the workplace based on disa-
bilities. 36 When Congress amended Title VII in 1991, it also amended the ADA to apply
extraterritorially. 37
C. THE CONFLICTING FOREIGN LAWS DEFENSE
The Conflicting Foreign Laws Defense allows employers to justify actions that would
otherwise violate the ADEA, Tide VII, or the ADA3 s Congress enacted the Conflicting
Foreign Laws Defense to "avoid placing overseas employers in the impossible position of
having to conform to two inconsistent legal regimes, one imposed from the United States
and the other imposed by the country in which the company operates." 39 The Defense
functions as follows. First, a U.S. employee working abroad sues the U.S. employer under
Title VII, the ADEA, or the ADA and establishes the prima facie elements for the dis-
crimination. 40 Next, the burden shifts to the employer to show that although its actions
would otherwise violate U.S. employment law, the Conflicting Foreign Laws Defense al-
lows its behavior because "compliance would cause [the employer] to violate [the foreign]
law."41 The employer raising the defense has the burden of proof to show that it is enti-
tled to protection under the Defense. 42
Part of courts' struggles in this analysis is that "it involves not only the application of
[U.S. employment law] by an American court, but also the interpretation of foreign
law." 43 The analysis is twofold. First, the court must determine whether Congress in-
tended for the act to apply extraterritorially.44 Fortunately, Congress has been explicit in
the employment laws as to whether they should apply extraterritorially. 45 And, second,
the court must determine whether the employer's conduct qualifies for the Conflicting
Foreign Laws Defense, which involves an analysis of whether there is a true conflict be-
tween the foreign law and U.S. law. 46 This is where the analysis becomes more difficult
because to determine whether there is a true conflict, the court must first determine what
foreign "law" it is comparing to U.S. law.
To better understand the Conflicting Foreign Laws Defense and this article's analysis,
one must understand the difference between a true and false conflict of laws. A true con-
34. Miller, supra note 8, at 442.
35. See Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 109, 105 Stat. 1077 (1991) (codified as amended at
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-1 (2006)).
36. See 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a).
37. See id. § 12112(c)(1).
38. See ADEA, 29 U.S.C. § 623; Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-l; ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12112.
39. Mahoney v. RFE/RL, Inc., 47 F.3d 447, 450 (D.C. Cir. 1995).
40. See Mahoney v. RFE/RL, Inc., 818 F. Supp. 1, 4 (D.D.C. 1992), revd, 47 F.3d 447 (D.C. Cir. 1995).
41. See id.
42. R. Charles Wilkin, Im, A Stranger in a Strange Land: Applying U.S. Laws to Employees Working Abroad, 8
OKLA. EMp'. L. LETTER, no. 10, 2000 at 5, 5.
43. Id.
44. See Morrison v. Nat'l Austl. Bank Ltd., 130 S. Ct. 2869, 2877-78 (2010).
45. See snpra Part I(A)-(B).
46. See, e.g., Mahoney v. RFE/RL, Inc., 47 F.3d 447, 450 (D.C. Cir. 1995).
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flict of laws is a situation where State A's law directly conflicts with State B's law.47 By
contrast, a false conflict occurs when the potentially applicable laws do not differ, or when
one law actually does not apply to the situation.48 For an example of a true conflict,
consider Kern v. Dynalectron Corp.49 The employee, Wade Kern, sued his employer,
Dynalectron Corporation, for religious discrimination under Title VII.50 Dynalectron
originally hired Kern to fly helicopters over the holy pilgrimage route to Mecca in Saudi
Arabia.Si Because Saudi Arabian law "prohibits the entry of non-Moslems into the holy
area, Mecca, under penalty of death," Dynalectron required all pilots who were to make
this trip to become Moslem.5 2 When Kern decided not to convert, Dynalectron offered
Kern another job that did not require his conversion. 53 The court held that "Kern was
constructively discharged" because "both Kern and Dynalectron understood that the
[original] job required Kern's conversion." 54 Kern met his burden of proof to show a
"prima facie case by a preponderance of the evidence," so Dynalectron was left with the
burden to "[establish] that the discrimination was not unlawful." 55 Instead, Dynalectron
raised the bona fide occupational exception to Title VII, which functions in the same way
as the Conflicting Foreign Laws Defense. 56 The court concluded that the employer's
requirement that the pilot be a Moslem in a certain position qualified for the bona fide
occupational qualification exception to Title VII because the "non-Moslem pi-
lots ... [were] not safe as compared to Moslem pilots."5 7 Kern notably recognized that a
defense to the employment laws should be "a narrow exception ... to avoid the situation
where the exception swallows the rule."5 8
47. See Peter K. Westen, False Conflicts, 55 CALIF. L. REV. 74, 79-80 (1967).
48. See id. at 80.
49. See generally 577 F. Supp. 1196 (N.D. Tex. 1983). For another example of a true conflict, consider:
Sarah is a U.S. citizen. She works as an assistant manager for an U.S. employer located in a
Middle Eastern Country. Sarah applies for the branch manager position. Although Sarah is the
most qualified person for the position, the employer informs her that it cannot promote her
because that country's laws forbid women from supervising men. Sarah files a charge alleging sex
discrimination. The employer would have a [Conflicting Foreign Laws Defense] for its actions if
the law does contain that prohibition.
Employee Rights When Working for International Employers, EEOC (Apr. 28, 2003), http://www.eeoc.gov/
facts/multi-employees.html.
50. See Kern, 577 F. Supp. at 1197.
51. See id.
52. Id. at 1198.
53. See id.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 1198-99.
56. Id. at 1200. The bona fide occupational exception functions in the same way in that the employer's
action would otherwise be illegal under U.S. employment law, but for the exception or the Defense. See id.
57. Id. at 1201.
58. Id. at 1199.
WINTER 2012
1034 THE INTERNATIONAL LAWYER
II. Current State of the Law: Congress Stays Silent, but D.C. Circuit Holds
"Law" may include "Policies or Practices"
Mahoney v. RFE/RL is the leading case regarding what constitutes "law" in the Conflict-
ing Foreign Laws Defense. 59 The case covered an ADEA matter, but for this article's
purposes Mahoney serves to analyze the Conflicting Foreign Laws Defense under the
ADEA, Title VII, and the ADA because the Defense is worded essentially identical in
these three U.S. employment laws.60 Furthermore, the purpose behind these laws is the
same-to protect the employee from discrimination. 61 This part explores how the Maho-
ney district and appellate courts differed on the interpretation of "law" in the Conflicting
Foreign Laws Defense. It will explain how the district court correctly deferred to the
legislature and read "law" to mean literally "law." Then this part will discuss the Mahoney
appellate court decision and how it judicially expanded the definition of "law" to include a
foreign state's "policies or practices."
A. MAHoNEY DISTRICT COURT HOLDS "LAW" MEANS "LAW"
In Mahoney, the plaintiffs, U.S. citizens, were employed by a Delaware corporation,
Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty (RFE/RL), whose principal place of business was in
Munich, Germany. 62 The U.S. citizen plaintiffs worked in Munich. 63 RFE/RL had vol-
untarily entered into a collective bargaining agreement with Munich unions. 64 A provi-
sion in the agreement expressly provided for mandatory retirement when employees
reached the age of sixty-five.65 The provision was widely accepted in Germany because it
was "modeled after a nation-wide agreement in the German broadcast industry."66 The
employer "concede[d] that it terminated plaintiffs because of their age" and "admit[ted]
that its actions would have violated the ADEA," but for the Conflicting Foreign Laws
Defense.67
Because Congress amended the ADEA, RFE/RL "initially thought its American em-
ployees in Munich would" not have to comply with the collective bargaining agreement's
mandatory retirement age, so it "applied to the 'Works Council' for limited exemptions
59. Mahoney is the "leading" case in the sense that, to the author's knowledge, no other case has affirma-
tively addressed the meaning of "law" in the Conflicting Foreign Laws Defense. It is not "leading" in that
other circuits have adopted it. Also, the case law on the Conflicting Foreign Laws Defense is surprisingly
small. It is surprising because one would think that because U.S. employment laws expressly have extraterri-
torial application, more corporations would try to raise the Defense. Perhaps one reason behind the small
amount of case law in this area is the undefined and unpredictable nature of the Defense. For example, the
district court and the appellate court in Mahoney analyzed foreign "law" very differently, which resulted in
opposite holdings. Compare Mahoney v. RFE/RL, Inc., 47 F.3d 447, 450 (D.C. Cir. 1995), with Mahoney v.
RFE/RL, Inc., 818 F. Supp. 1, 4 (D.D.C. 1992). Another reason is perhaps that the foreign law often does
not actually conflict with U.S. employment law.
60. See 29 U.S.C. § 623(0(1) (2006); 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-l(b), 12112(c)(1) (2006).
61. See 29 U.S.C. § 623(a); 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2(a), 12112(a).
62. Mahoney, 818 F. Supp. at 2.
63. See id.
64. See id. at 3.
65. See id.
66. Mahoney v. RFE/RL, Inc., 47 F.3d 447, 450 (D.C. Cir. 1995).
67. Mahoney, 818 F. Supp. at 3.
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from its contractual obligation" under the collective bargaining agreement.68 The Works
Council reviewed its request and confirmed that "allowing only those employees who
were American citizens to work past the age of sixty-five would violate not only the
mandatory retirement provision, but also the collective bargaining agreement's provision
forbidding discrimination on the basis of nationality." 69 When RFE/RL appealed the
Work Council's rejection of its request to exempt the U.S. employees in Munich, the
Munich Labor Court "agreed with the Works Council that RFE/RL must uniformly en-
force the mandatory retirement provisions because exemptions would unfairly discrimi-
nate against German workers." 70 Finally, the Labor Court notified RFE/RL that it could
not "[retain] employees over the age of sixty-five." 71
The plaintiffs proceeded to sue RFE/RL under the ADEA.72 The district court ulti-
mately held that it had jurisdiction over the matter and that RFE/RL was liable under the
ADEA because it could not successfully raise the Conflicting Foreign Laws Defense.
73
The district court found that the Conflicting Foreign Laws Defense did not apply for two
reasons. First, because the mandatory retirement provision was "part of a contract be-
tween an employer and unions-both private entities-and [had] not in any way been
mandated by the German government.74 Second, the provision [did] not have general
application, as laws normally do, but [bound] only the parties to the contract." 75 Addi-
tionally, the court found, "[ifl overseas employers could avoid application of the ADEA
simply by embedding an age-discriminatory provision in a contract, having a foreign court
enforce the contract, and calling the court's decision 'law,' then the Act's extraterritorial
provisions would be largely nullified, for employers could easily contract around the
law." 76
In concluding that the case did not involve a true conflict of laws, the court emphasized,
"[Piractices and policies, even when embodied in contracts, are not 'laws."' 77 The court
also recognized that Congress enacted the ADEA as a "remedial statute" to protect em-
ployees from age discrimination in the workplace, so the Defense should be "construed
narrowly."78 Notably, especially now in light of Morrison,79 the district court correctly
recognized that because Congress had not expressed any "authority directly on point," the
court would not read "the term 'laws' to extend beyond its ordinary meaning." 80 In fact,
the court acknowledged that Congress had specified "'policies or practices' of foreign
governments" when it had enacted arms trading legislation.81 Thus, because Congress
only mentioned "laws" and not "policies or practices"-which it could have done and has




72. See Mahoney, 818 F. Supp. at 3.
73. See id. at 6.
74. Id. at 3.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 5.
77. Id. at 3.
78. Id.
79. See infra Part 1II(A).
80. Mahoney, 818 F. Supp. at 4.
81. Id.
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done in the past-the court concluded that the Conflicting Foreign Laws Defense only
applied when a foreign state's "laws" and not simply "policies or practices" were in conflict
with the ADEA.2
B. MAHONEY APPELLATE COURT READS "LAW" TO INCLUDE "POLICIES OR
PRACTICES"
The appellate court disagreed with the district court and allowed RFE/RL to use the
Conflicting Foreign Laws Defense.83 The court reasoned that "[c]ongressional legislation
cannot . .. set aside the laws of foreign countries. When an overseas employer's obliga-
tions under foreign law collide with its obligations under the [ADEA], [the Conflicting
Foreign Laws Defense] quite sensibly solves the dilemma by relieving the employer of
liability under the Act."84
In holding that RFE/RL's collective bargaining agreement entitled it to use the De-
fense, the court brushed by the district court's reasoninges and instead predominantly
relied on Norfolk & Western Railway v. American Train Dispatchers' Ass'n. 86 Norfolk recog-
nized that when a rail carrier was exempt "from all other law," "law" included a "carrier's
legal obligations under a collective-bargaining agreement."87 The Court also recognized
that contracts "[have] no legal force apart from the law that acknowledges its binding
character"88 so "[t]he obligation of a contract is 'the law [that] binds the parties to perform
their agreement.' '"89
The court also noted that its holding would "agree[] with § 623(f)(1)'s evident pur-
pose-to avoid placing overseas employers in the impossible position of having to con-
form to two inconsistent legal regimes, one imposed from the United States and the other
imposed by the country in which the company operates." 90 Notably, the court did not
mention the larger purpose behind the full ADEA.
III. Analysis: A Doctrinal Look at How the D.C. Circuit Overstepped
Judicial Bounds in Mahoney and Upset the Separation of Powers
Balance
The D.C. Circuit overstepped its bounds in Mahoney. It noted, "[c]ongressional legisla-
don cannot... set aside the laws of foreign countries."9 1 This statement is true and would
have been applied to Mahoney had there been a true conflict between the U.S. law and the
foreign law. The problem is that the D.C. Circuit did not provide a convincing argument
82. Id.
83. Mahoney v. RFE/RL, Inc., 47 F.3d 447, 450-51 (D.C. Cir. 1995).
84. Id. at 450.
85. Notably, the D.C. Circuit never addressed the expressio unius est exclusio alterius rationale.
86. Id. at 449 (citing Norfolk & W. Ry. v. Am. Train Dispatchers' Ass'n, 499 U.S. 117, 127 (1991)).
87. Norfolk, 499 U.S. at 127-28.
88. Id. at 130.
89. Id. at 129 (quoting Home Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 429 (1934)).
90. See Mahoney v. RFE/RL, Inc., 47 F.3d 447, 450 (D.C. Cir. 1995).
91. Id.
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regarding why the German "policies or practices" were actually "law." 92 If the "policies or
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U.S. employment laws state plainly that without a true conflict between U.S. employ-
ment law and the foreign "law," the employer cannot raise the Conflicting Foreign Laws
Defense.9 5 This article proposes that Mahoney did not involve a true conflict because the
foreign "law" did not read contrary to U.S. law. As the table shows, a true conflict does
not exist because the foreign state does not have a "law" that conflicts with the ADEA.
Because no conflict exists, the employer cannot raise the Defense, and the employer would
be liable under the ADEA.
Three main doctrinal arguments support this analysis. First, this part analyzes how
Morrison strengthens the Mahoney district court's reading of the Conflicting Foreign Laws
Defense over the appellate court's reasoning. Next, it supports the district court's expressio
unius est exclusio alterius analysis and asks why the D.C. Circuit ignored this part of the
district court's opinion. Finally, this part returns to Congress's original purpose behind
U.S. employment laws, balances it against the sub-purpose behind the Conflicting For-
eign Laws Defense, and concludes that the language in the Defense should be read in
cohesion with Congress's original purpose behind U.S. employment laws.
A. MORRISON REINVIGORATES DEFERENCE TO CONGRESS
1. General Overview of Morrison's Two-Part Test
This article views the question of whether an employer's actions qualify for the Con-
flicting Foreign Laws Defense as a matter of prescriptive, not adjudicative, jurisdiction.
92. See supra text accompanying notes 86-91. Norfolk, the case that the D.C. Circuit relied on, is flawed
because how can a contract be the same as law if it relies on law for its legal force? Furthermore, if a contract
(here, the collective bargaining agreement) were really law, then parties could simply contract around actual
laws. Also, to determine Congress's intent behind the statute, the court should have looked at the intent
behind the whole statute, not simply one part of the whole. See infra Part 111(c). It should have erred on the
side of caution, as did the district court, especially because the purpose behind U.S. employment laws is to
protect workers from discrimination. Rather than reading the defense narrowly, as it should have done, the
court actually broadly read the text in a way that hurt the individuals whom Congress intended to protect. It
is not the court's job to decide issues of foreign policy.
93. 29 U.S.C. § 623 (2006).
94. See Mahoney v. RFE/RL, Inc., 818 F. Supp. 1, 3 (D.D.C. 1992), rev'd, 47 F.3d 448 (D.C. Cir. 1995).
95. 29 U.S.C. § 623 (2006) (ADEA); 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-I (Title VII); 12112 (ADA).
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This view is distinguishable from the thought that Congress gave the courts jurisdiction
over employment law claims, under which the courts engage in a comity analysis of
whether the courts should abstain to respect the foreign state's sovereignty. 96 The analy-
sis should be a question of whether the law had legislative (prescriptive) jurisdiction to
begin with. Specifically, the analysis asks whether Congress intended to apply the act to
the conduct at issue, not whether the court should decline to apply the act. To determine
whether Congress intended the Defense to cover an employer's actions, Morrison provides
the latest guidance from the U.S. Supreme Court on the applicable canons of statutory
construction.
In 2010, the Supreme Court set forth the standard to determine whether an act applies
extraterritorially. 97 The plaintiffs, Australian investors, sued an Australian bank (National
Australia Bank Ltd.) and an American company (HomeSide) for conspiring to defraud the
Australian investors. 98 Australia was the location of the Australian bank, the investors who
were harmed, and the transaction. 99 Some fraud occurred in Florida that influenced the
stock price, but otherwise the main players and transactions were in Australia.1 00
Before Morrison, the test for extraterritoriality was the "conduct-and-effects test."1 01
The Supreme Court moved away from this test and reinvigorated the presumption against
extraterritoriality.10 2 Morrison criticized the various tests that courts had been using as
having gutted the presumption against extraterritorial application. 10 3 It was more con-
cerned with deference to the legislature; it did not want judges to start putting themselves
in Congress's head.104 The Court's rationale was to place the burden of deciding matters
of foreign policy back into the correct branch's purview-that is, the Legislative, and not
the Judicial branch. 105 If Congress intends for a certain circumstance to fall under a law, it
should "affirmative[ly]" indicate that intent; otherwise, a court should not read into a law
96. In Hartford Fire Insurance Co. v. California, U.K. reinsurers had conspired to adversely affect the U.S.
reinsurance market. 509 U.S. 764, 770 (1993). The defendants' actions were legal in the United Kingdom,
but they would have been a violation of U.S. antitrust laws. Id. at 769-70. The issue was whether the Sher-
man Act applied to the U.K. defendants' conduct that affected the United States. Id. at 779. Justice Sourer
analyzed the problem in terms of adjudicative jurisdiction, namely, because Congress gave the Court jurisdic-
tion over the Sherman Act, the question was whether the Court should abstain as a matter of comity. Id. at
794. Justice Scalia, the author of Morrison, disagreed and said it was really a matter of prescriptive jurisdic-
tion. Compare id. at 795 n.22, with id. at 812-20 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Justice Scalia analyzed the question as
whether the Sherman Act even reached the conduct to begin with-specifically, whether Congress intended
the Sherman Act to apply to the U.K. defendants' conduct. Id. at 812-20. This article agrees with Justice
Scalia's cleaner analysis that respects the separation of powers.
97. See Morrison v. Nat'l Austl. Bank Ltd., 130 S. Ct. 2869, 2877-78 (2010).
98. Id. at 2875-76.
99. Id.
100. See id.
101. Id. at 2889 ("This test asks '(1) whether the wrongful conduct occurred in the Unites States, and
(2) whether the wrongful conduct had a substantial effect in the United States or upon [U.S.] citizens.'")
(quoting Morrison v. Nat'l Austl. Bank Ltd., 547 F.3d 167, 171 (2d Cir. 2008)).
102. See id. at 2891-95.
103. See id. at 2878-81.
104. See id. at 2882-83.
105. Id.
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an intent that is not there.106 Morrison reinforced the separation of powers between the
judiciary branch and the executive and legislative branches. 10 7
Morrison created a two-part test. First, Congress must have clearly indicated its intent
to apply a certain act extraterritorially, or else the presumption against extraterritoriality
applies.108 The indication must be an affirmative indication, which raised the bar by re-
quiring Congress to have actually written the indication in the law. 109 Second, the Court
localizes the cause of action by looking at the focus of the statute. 110 If the focus is for-
eign, then the presumption against extraterritoriality applies. Morrison localized the trans-
action to Australia and applied the presumption. In the U.S. employment law context,
only part one of the Morrison test applies. Part two does not apply because it deals with
whether a law applies extraterritorially at all, which Congress has already specified that
U.S. employment laws do.
2. Under Morrison, a True Conflict Cannot Currently Exist Between U.S. Employment
Law and Foreign Policies or Practices
Scholars might be inclined to overlook Morrison's application to certain U.S. employ-
ment laws-specifically, the ADA, the ADEA, and Title VII-because Congress has ex-
plicitly provided extraterritorial application. But the application is not necessarily as clear
as one might think. Specifically, Congress has made clear whether these employment laws
extend extraterritorially, but have not made clear when an employer's actions would qual-
ify for the Conflicting Foreign Laws Defense. As one scholar smartly noted, "A law is
only as good, or as powerful, as its exceptions allow it to be."'11 Because Congress has not
indicated that foreign "laws" includes anything other than law in the Conflicting Foreign
Laws Defense, the D.C. Circuit essentially engaged in "mak[ing] foreign policy decisions,
with the attendant risks of international conflict and the threat of trampling on the execu-
tive branch's prerogative to make foreign policy." 1 12
Now we have the Morrison rule to analyze whether a statute applies to a given situation.
Courts have indicated that Morrison is not limited to only securities law matters. 113 In
fact, the rationale behind Morrison is even more applicable in the U.S. employment law
context than it was to the Morrison scenario. Morrison's reasoning is more applicable in
this context because here Congress has affirmatively indicated that U.S. employment laws
extend extraterritorially, whereas in Morrison Congress had not done so with securities
laws. Because Congress has in fact considered the extraterritorial application of U.S. em-
106. Id. at 2878.
107. See id. at 2883.
108. Id. at 2877. This article uses the first part of the Morrison test to support the notion of deferring to
Congress when reading a statute (that is, whether Congress intended the Defense to cover an employer's
actions when the foreign policies or practices, but not the foreign law, support that action).
109. See id.
110. See id. at 2884.
111. See Thomas Wang, Note, Mahoney v. RFE/RL: An Unexpected Direction for the Foreign Laws Defense, 30
VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 379, 379 (1997) (abstract).
112. Id. at 411.
113. See Mahoneyv. RFE/RL, Inc., 818 F. Supp. 1, 5 (D.D.C. 1992), rev'd, 47 F.3d 447 (D.C. Cir. 1995).
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ployment laws, and then drafted the Defense in the way that it reads now, courts should
read its text even more narrowly than did the Court in Morrison.14
B. EXPRESSIO UNius EST EXCLUsIO ALTERIUS
The Latin phrase expressio unius est exclusio alterius is "[a] maxim of statutory interpreta-
tion meaning that the expression of one thing is the exclusion of another." 5 Applying
this maxim, if Congress does not use a phrase in a Law A that it uses in Law B, which is a
similar law, then by excluding that phrase Congress did not intend it to be in Law A. The
Mahoney district court recognized this rationale; however, the appellate court did not even
address the issue.1 16 The Mahoney district court noted, because Congress has used the
phrase "policies or practices" in extending other laws extraterritorially, that Congress sim-
ply using "law" and not "law, policies, or practices," or even merely "policies or practices,"
in the Conflicting Foreign Laws Defense indicates Congress did not intend to include
"policies or practices" in foreign "law."" 7
Courts have long recognized that determining the scope of a law's application is a mat-
ter for Congress, not the courts, to decide." 8 In fact, in the U.S. employment law con-
text, the Supreme Court has already recognized that Congress should step in when the law
is unclear as to whether it applies extraterritorially in EEOC v. ARAMCO." 9 Although
the Conflicting Foreign Laws Defense by its nature applies extraterritorially, 120 the great
disparity between the Mahoney district and appellate court interpretations of foreign "law"
shows in itself that the situations under which an employer's actions qualify for the De-
fense are contentious.121 This problem has a simple solution: Because Congress has indi-
cated "policies or practices" in another similar area,122 but did not do so here, expressio
unius est exclusio alterius, courts should not presume that Congress did not intend "law" to
mean "law."
C. HARMONIOUSLY INTERPRETING THE CONFLICTING FOREIGN LAWS DEFENSE IN
LIGHT OF THE WHOLE PURPOSE BEHIND U.S. EMPLOYMENT LAWS
"In analyzing a statute's text, [courts are] guided by the basic principle that a statute
should be read as a harmonious whole, with its separate parts being interpreted within
their broader statutory context in a manner that furthers statutory purpose."1 23 The Ma-
honey appellate court recognized the Conflicting Foreign Laws Defense's "evident pur-
114. See Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2877-78.
115. BLACK's LAw DICTIONARY 581 (6th ed. 1991).
116. Maboney, 818 F. Supp. at 4.
117. Id.
118. See, e.g., EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244, 248 (1991).
119. Id. at 259. Congress's response to ARAMCO was to broaden the scope of "employee" to include "[w]ith
respect to employment in a foreign country... an individual who is a citizen of the United States." 42 U.S.C
§ 2000e(t) (2006).
120. The Conflicting Foreign Laws Defense by its nature applies extraterritorially because it only arises in
contexts dealing with U.S. employers (or foreign employers controlled by a U.S. corporation) that operate
abroad and employ U.S. employees.
121. See supra Part H.
122. The situation is similar in that Congress was amending a law to extend extraterritorially.
123. YULE Kims, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., Order Code 97-589, STATUTORY INTERPRETATION: GENERAL
PRINCIPLES AND RECENT TREiDs 2 (2008), available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/97-589.pdf.
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pose-to avoid placing overseas employers in the impossible position of having to
conform to two inconsistent legal regimes, one imposed from the United States and the
other imposed by the country in which the company operates."' 24 The court however
fails to ever mention the purpose behind the ADEA, to which the Conflicting Foreign
Laws Defense is only a part. The purpose behind the ADEA was to protect individuals,
such as the plaintiffs in Mahoney, from age discrimination in the workplace.' 25 Because
Congress's purpose behind the ADEA is clear, and because Congress chose to use "law"
rather than "laws, policies, or practices" in the Defense, the D.C. Circuit should have read
the "ambiguous" 126 part of the law in a way that "further[ed] [the ADEA's] purpose."'
27
The Mahoney decision has set a "troubling precedent" for the standard for extraterri to-
rial application of U.S. employment laws. 128 Different interests at play in this decision
include:
[T]he interest in eliminating employment discrimination against U.S. citizens, the
legitimate desire of foreign states to regulate their domestic workplaces, 129 the poten-
tial for international disputes stemming from jurisdictional or cultural overreaching
by the United States, the rational impulse of U.S. companies to avoid being caught in
conflicting social and legal regimes, and the reluctance of U.S. courts to become
involved in international policy making.' 30
Although the decision takes into account the interests of the parties, the D.C. Circuit
seemed to focus more on the employer's burden rather than the employees' individual
rights. This unequal balancing of interests is contrary to Congress's intent behind the
ADEA, which was to protect employees from discrimination in the workplace.' 3'
IV. Recommendation
Working within the current state of the law courts can preserve Congress's intent be-
hind U.S. employment laws by strictly adhering to the rationale behind Morrison. An
immediate recommendation that can be implemented the next time a Conflicting Foreign
Laws Defense case reaches federal court would be to follow the rationale behind Morrison
and to defer to the legislature when analyzing "ambiguous" terminology, such as foreign
"law" in the Defense. Regarding the Mahoney appellate decision, in light of the canons of
statutory construction that weigh in favor of deferring to Congress in reading what "law"
means, courts should recognize that Mahoney is operating outside of the correct state of
124. Mahoney v. RFE/RL, Inc., 47 F.3d 447, 450 (D.C. Cit. 1995).
125. See 29 U.S.C. § 623 (2006) (ADEA).
126. The author does not believe the term foreign "law" is ambiguous, but because the courts have struggled
with its interpretation, it will treat the word as such in giving recommendations. See supra text accompanying
note 16.
127. See stipra text accompanying note 122.
128. See Wang, supra note 111, at 410.
129. This article recognizes that the problem of unequal treatment of U.S. citizen versus non-U.S. citizen
employees might arise if the employer were to comply with U.S. law regarding the U.S. citizen; however, the
alternative of not protecting either employee is not preferable. If the United States can operate within the
law and protect its citizen, this article supports taking the required action to do so.
130. Wang, supra note 111, at 381.
131. See 29 U.S.C. § 623 (2006).
WINTER 2012
1042 THE INTERNATIONAL LAWYER
the law. This solution will not only provide more predictability for U.S. employees and
employers, but also for the foreign states out of which these U.S. corporations operate.
Then the foreign states will be on notice that if their policies or practices are so important
to them that they would want to enforce them against U.S. employees and employers in
their state, then they should enact "blocking laws" that would achieve this purpose. 32
Because these issues often confront the foreign jurisdiction's religious beliefs' 33 or ac-
cepted customs, these circumstances are often hotly political and controversial. 134 For this
reason, the political branches should be the voice that acknowledges what is foreign "law,"
not the courts, which as this article demonstrates, might muddy the waters even more
through inconsistent interpretations.135
One might point out problems in this recommendation for several reasons. First, one
might argue that strict deference to the legislature is neither realistic nor desirable in
certain circumstances because it may be that Congress actually intended the law to apply
to the scenario and thought that the courts would be able to discern that intent. Second,
one might argue that so much deference to the legislature undermines the court's author-
ity to enforce the law. Finally, some might read Congress's silence on the matter after
Mahoney as an indication that it supports the decision's holding.
To respond to these concerns, although this article acknowledges this solution is not
perfect, an immediate recommendation to give more deference to the legislature is prefer-
able to alternative solutions. The U.S. Supreme Court has evidenced that it supports the
presumption against extraterritoriality (and more importantly, deference to Congress and
the separation of powers balance), especially where Congress has evidenced its intent. 36
Here, Congress has evidenced its intent to apply the ADA, the ADEA, and Title VII
extraterritorially.' 37 Furthermore, Congress has not affirmatively indicated that the term
"law" should include anything other than the term's ordinary meaning. Thus, even if
Congress's silence since Mahoney did imply that Congress supported its decision to in-
clude "policies or practices" in "law," Morrison shows us that Congress must still "affirma-
tive[ly]" indicate this intent.' 38 Following another canon of statutory construction,
expressio unius est exclusio alterius, because Congress has used the phrase "policies or prac-
tices" when extending another law extraterritorially, but did not use that same phrase
here, courts should view this as Congress not intending to include the phrase in this
132. See Wang, supra note 111, at 406.
133. For example, "Muslim law is not an independent branch of knowledge or learning, but is a facet of the
Islamic religion itself. In many cases, it is difficult to separate Islamic law from Islamic theology." Smith,
supra note 17, at 211 (citing David Suratgar, The Development of the Legal Systems of the Middle East;
Islamic Law and the Importance of Civil Law to the Process of Modernization, in An Introduction to Busi-
ness in the Middle East 1, 3 (Brian Russell ed., 1976)). Note, however, that sometimes the foreign state will
recognize religion as a source of legislation, even "instructling] judges to fill any gaps in the codes according
to the principles of Muslim law." Id. at 211 n. 143 ("For example, the Constitution of Kuwait states: 'The
religion of the State is Islam, and Islamic Sharia shall be a main source of legislation.'") (citing KuvArr
CONST. art. II, translated in 10 Albert Blaustein & Gilbert H. Flanz, CONSTITUTONS OF THE COUNTRIES
OF THE WORLD: KuWArr 12 (1991)).
134. See, e.g., id. at 208.
135. See supra Part 11(B).
136. Morrison v. Nat'l Austl. Bank Ltd., 130 S. Ct. 2869, 2878 (2010).
137. See 29 U.S.C. § 623 (2006) (ADEA); 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-1 (Title VII); 12112 (ADA).
138. Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2877.
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law. 139 Finally, one might alternatively argue that we should just let the standards for the
Defense play out in the courts-that we should let the courts formulate the rules on a
case-by-case basis. This alternative is not desirable because it would weave an unpredict-
able web around the Defense.' 40
The court should place emphasis on the employer's burden when there is a true conflict
between the U.S. law and the foreign law; however, this was not the situation in Mahoney.
In fact, "the German government had expressed no opinion on the controversy," and
scholars have noted, "[Ift does not appear that deciding to force RFE/RL to comply with
the ADEA would have implicated any delicate foreign policy matters." 14 1 When even the
foreign state has not established whether the matter at issue is "law," our courts should not
do that job for them without an affirmative indication from Congress. 4 2
Conclusion
Although Congress had never indicated that "laws" in the Defense implies anything
other than the ordinary reading of the word "laws," Mahoney nonetheless found that the
"policies or practices" of the foreign state constituted "laws." Because the foreign state's
"policies or practices" conflicted with U.S. employment laws, Mahoney allowed the em-
ployer to raise the Defense even though its actions would have otherwise been a violation
of the ADEA.
The court's analysis was flawed for three doctrinal reasons. First, in light of Morrison,
which reinvigorated deference to Congress and the separation of powers balance, the
court was wrong to read more into the Defense than was actually in the text. Second,
because Congress included "policies or practices" in a similar law, but chose only to in-
clude "law" in the Defense, under the maxim of statutory construction expressio unius est
exclusio alterius, "law" means "law." Finally, harmoniously reading the intent behind the
Defense and U.S. employment laws, even if the court struggled with the term foreign
"law," it should have interpreted the Defense in conformity with the intent to protect
employees from discrimination in the workplace.
Doctrine firmly supports courts' narrow interpretation of the Conflicting Foreign Laws
Defense until Congress affirmatively indicates otherwise. Therefore, courts should read
the term foreign "law" in the Defense to only include law, excluding policies and prac-
tices. If courts adhere to Morrison's rationale, the courts' interpretations will become uni-
form and continue to uphold the intent behind the U.S. employment laws. 14 3
139. See supra Part III(B).
140. See Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2881.
141. Wang, szipra note 111, at 410 (citing Mahoney v. RFE/RL, Inc., 818 F. Supp. 1, 6 (D.D.C. 1992), rev'd,
47 F.3d 447 (D.C. Cir. 1995)).
142. See Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2877-78.
143. See Mahoney v. RFE/RL, Inc., 47 F.3d 447, 450 (D.C. Cir. 1995); see also Wang, supra note 111, at 411-
12.
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